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Abstract
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Th   is study is about the growth and development performance of non-industrialized countries in the lat-
ter part of the twentieth century, in particular about a “great divergence” of their growth rates of per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) since around 1980. Our goal is to explore the factors underlying this 
pattern, and trace out plausible lines of causation for its diversity. Th   e analysis follows Kuznets (1966) in 
attempting to organize the data in such a way as to highlight salient relationships, or the lack thereof, among 
key economic variables.
Changes in growth trends and widening income inequality among developing countries and be-
tween developed and most developing countries coincided with important changes in views on economic 
policies. A major shift occurred worldwide after the 1970s and 1980s when, under the tutelage of World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), most developing countries moved to liberalize their external 
current and capital accounts along with domestic labour and ﬁ  nancial markets. Th   ey also privatized public 
enterprises, de-emphasized industrial policy interventions, and encouraged a greater private sector role in 
general. Emphasis was placed on supply-side “accumulation” processes, for physical and human capital and 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Fiscal austerity ﬁ  gured in many programs sponsored by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. More than a quarter of a century has passed since the ﬁ  rst versions of IMF and World Bank 
macro reforms became the conventional wisdom. Data are now available for a long enough time to enable 
policy analysts to sort their implications out.
At best, the new orientation had mixed results in either reversing the slowdown in growth that many 
countries encountered in the last quarter of the twentieth century (details below) or helping them break 
away from their poverty and low level development traps (Taylor, 2001 and 2006; Vos and others, 2002). 
Indeed, income gaps have widened over time. 
We begin by investigating economic evolution for the period 1970-2003, studying several indica-
tors to see how they relate to the growth or non-growth of per capita GDP. Th   e policy background is then 
brought in, with emphasis on ideas emanating from the Bretton Woods institutions. Suggestions are oﬀ  ered 
about other approaches to policy that may help generate more sustained and equitable development than has 
been the case in the recent past.
To keep the discussion within bounds, the data are organized in terms of 12 regional groups in-
cluding 57 developing and transition countries: rapidly growing East Asian economies (or the “Tigers”), 
Southeast Asia, China, South Asia, semi-industrialized “Latin America” (including South Africa and Turkey 
with economic structures similar to their counterparts in the Western Hemisphere), the Andean countries, 
Central America and the Caribbean, Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and Ukraine representing the for-
mer USSR, “representative” and “other” countries in sub-Saharan Africa2, and the Middle East. Th  e  nations 
in each group are listed in Appendix I.
1  Research support from DESA and the Ford Foundation and suggestions by José Antonio Ocampo, Jomo K. S., and 
Rob Vos are gratefully acknowledged.
2 Th   e representative group is made up of four countries often discussed in the development literature, and the others are 
included essentially on grounds of data availability.2  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Divergence in the 20th Century
To set the discussion Figure 1 shows the GDP and sectoral per capita output growth rates by region in 
constant 1990 US dollars.3 We identify three cohorts of regions and countries that had similar patterns of 
growth:
Th  ere  was  sustained growth in the Tigers, China, Southeast Asia, and South Asia (dominated by In-
dia). Relative to the other regions, South Asia had less robust expansion and Southeast Asia did not bounce 
back as strongly from the 1997 crisis as did the Tigers. Th   ese regions “diverged upwardly” from the rest of 
the developing world.
Th  e  second,  late recovery group includes semi-industrialized Latin America, Central America and Ca-
ribbean, and Central and Eastern Europe. All the regions showed somewhat faster growth late in the century, 
although formerly socialist Europe is in an ambiguous situation. Over the period 1970-2003 it grew slightly 
faster in per capita terms than South Asia (2.7 per cent vs. 2.6 per cent per year) but because of the transi-
tion shock around 1990 it seemed more appropriate to call its case one of “late recovery.” 
Finally, the two African regions with other Africa dominated by Nigeria, the Andean group, the 
Middle East, and Russia and Ukraine were either stagnant throughout the period or experienced volatile eco-
nomic expansion. Data for the last decade suggest that Representative Africa and Russia and Ukraine have 
been enjoying growth which if is continues could advance them into the late recovery group. 
3  It is customary to make international income comparisons in terms of purchasing power parity (or PPP). However, as 
explained in Appendix II, PPP estimates distort the macroeconomic relationships that are at the heart of our analysis. 
When it comes to policy formation, it is far more useful to think about macro relationships in traditional “real” terms. 
Figure 1:
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Source: World Development 
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Identifying Structural Change
Sustained growth in successful regions was associated with changes in economic structure in several dimen-
sions. Th   e slow growers did not generate such changes. Economists trained in the structuralist tradition hold 
that development requires economic transformation or the “ability of an economy to constantly generate 
new dynamic activities” (Ocampo, 2005) characterized by higher productivity and increasing returns to 
scale. Our evidence supports this point of view. Recognizing the structural shifts that occurred in the regions 
with sustained growth can help chart future directions that other developing economies may be able to take. 
Needless to say, any economy is a unique entity with its own characteristics that require its own policies. But 
stylized facts show that there are dynamic movements of key macro variables that show up in connection 
with sustained output growth across diﬀ  erent economic systems. 
In this paper, we analyze these movements from several angles, in terms of formalized decomposi-
tion exercises (algebraic details in Appendix II) and more informal analysis of data on foreign trade patterns, 
human capital accumulation, and FDI.
One decomposition breaks down labour productivity growth between agricultural, industrial, and 
service sectors. Overall productivity growth comes out as an average of own-rates of growth, weighted by 
output shares, for all sectors along with “reallocation eﬀ  ects” which are positive for sectors with relatively low 
average productivity in which employment falls or for high-productivity sectors in which employment rises.4 
A second exercise focuses on growth rates of the economy-wide employment to population ratio 
which is decomposed into an average of growth rates of the ratio by sectors weighted by employment shares. 
At both the national and sectoral levels, the ratio of employment to total population will rise if the growth 
rate of output per capita exceeds growth of labour productivity.5 An economy can be considered to be per-
forming well if it has both sustained productivity growth and a stable or rising employment-population ratio.
Th   irdly, we examine the association between capital stock and output growth. We also contrast 
growth rates of labour and capital productivity and ask how they feed into widely used but fundamentally 
misleading calculations of “total factor productivity growth.” Th   e two inputs’ productivity growth rates turn 
out to be linked by a simple accounting identity, which helps explain the “Asian” pattern of falling capital 
productivity over time.
Finally, we look at net borrowing ﬂ  ows—incomes minus expenditures—over time for the govern-
ment, private, and rest of the world “institutional sectors”, normalized by GDP.6 As an accounting identity, 
borrowings must sum to zero:
(Private investment—saving) + (Public spending—taxes) + (Exports—Imports) = 0, 
with a positive entry indicating that a sector is a net contributor to eﬀ  ective demand. Changing sectoral 
roles in this equation can be important aspects of the growth process. For example, as shown in section 10, 
mutually oﬀ  setting co-movements of government and foreign net borrowing occurred sporadically at most. 
In other words, the widely accepted “twin deﬁ  cits” view of macro adjustment does not seem to apply. Nor 
4 Th   e approach follows Syrquin (1986).
5 Th   e original insight is from Pasinetti (1981).
6 Th   e approach followed here is a variant on a demand decomposition proposed by Godley and Cripps (1983).4  DESA Working Paper No. 34
do the data suggest that “consumption-smoothing” behaviour—an important feature of mainstream Ricard-
ian equivalence growth theory -- is empirically relevant. Macroeconomic ﬂ  exibility, on the other hand, may 
be very important. Strong ﬂ  uctuations in private and foreign net borrowing did not derail growth in the 
upwardly diverging Tigers and, to a lesser extent, Southeast Asia.
Output Growth Patterns
Th   e contrast in Figure 1 between Asia and Eastern Europe and the other regions is striking. Th   e Asian re-
gions (even South Asia) had very high growth rates in industry. Service sector growth was strong in Central 
and Eastern Europe and, to a lesser extent, in Latin America and Central American and the Caribbean.
Figures 2-4 present scatter plots of per capita GDP growth in the agriculture and industry vs. the 
Figure 2:
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percentage changes in their respective sectoral shares (again 1970-2003). Th   e rapidly growing Asian coun-
tries identiﬁ  ed in Figure 1 showed substantial shifts in shares, in the classic movement from primary toward 
secondary and tertiary sectors.
Figure 2 for the agricultural share shows a negatively sloped regression line for the whole 12-region 
sample. But contrast the results for the ﬁ  ve fast-growing regions with those for the others. While the former 
show a clear relationship between faster output growth and a decreasing share, the lagging seven regions 
generate a random scatter—a result that will repeat itself for several other indicators of structural change. 
Among the rapid growers, China’s agricultural share fell by an astonishing 34 percentage points over the 
period. In South and Southeast Asia, agriculture saw its output share decline 19 and 17 percentage points 
respectively. Th   e rising agricultural shares in the Andean and Middle Eastern regions are anomalous as is the 
decrease accompanied by negative growth in Russia and Ukraine.
Similar observations apply to the industrial sector and service sectors with clear associations emerg-
ing for the rapid growers and ill-deﬁ  ned data clouds for the other regions. Growth is associated with struc-
tural change and the absence of growth is not.
Th   e growing regions had rising industrial shares as can be observed in Figure 3 (less so in Central 
and Eastern Europe which prior to 1970 had already been pushed toward industrial specialization). Four 
slow growers suﬀ  ered long-term deindustrialization, while the industrial share in Russia and Ukraine scarcely 
budged. Big shifts in industrial shares in the Middle East and other Africa (with Nigeria as the largest 
economy included) were driven by developments in the petroleum sector.
Th   e fast growers had predictable increases in the service sector share in ﬁ  gure 4. Th  e  Tiger  region 
service share rose to 64 percent by 2003, and supported strong job creation as reported below. Th   ere was no 
apparent relationship for the lagging regions.
Figure 4:
Growth performance and structural change 
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Labour Productivity Growth
Historically, labour productivity increases have been the major contributing factor to growth in real GDP 
per capita. At the same time, faster productivity increases cut into employment growth unless they are oﬀ  set 
by rising eﬀ  ective demand. Figure 5 shows overall productivity growth for the period 1991-2003/4. Th  e  ﬁ  ve 
rapidly growing regions had productivity growth rates exceeding—some greatly exceeding—the rich country 
norm of two per cent per year. Th   e others fell well short, and the former USSR had negative productivity 
growth.
In terms of phasing over time, more detailed results (not presented here) show that Russia/Ukraine 
suﬀ  ered an enormous productivity collapse (-9.7 per cent per year) in 1991-1995, but then recovered to 
5.6 per cent (1999-2003). Central and Eastern Europe showed a similar though far less violent pattern. 
Th   e Tiger region rapidly recovered its productivity growth rate of 4-5 per cent per year after the 1997 Asian 
crisis. Southeast Asia also had 4-5 per cent annual productivity growth prior to the 1997, but rates tailed oﬀ   
thereafter. Th   e other regions had growth rate ﬂ  uctuations over time but no clear trends.
Figures 6-8 summarize direct and reallocation contributions by sector to overall productivity 
increases. Agriculture in Figure 6 evidently did not play a crucial role in the process. In several countries 
agriculture’s reallocation eﬀ  ects were negative. Th   e meaning is that this sector, with its relatively low average 
productivity, had positive employment growth. Th  is  ﬁ  nding is not surprising in countries such as China, 
South Asia, and Africa where agriculture’s share in total employment is signiﬁ  cant but the result is slightly 
discordant in the Middle East.
Th   e industrial sector’s own productivity growth made a substantial contribution to the total in four 
of the rapidly growing regions (Figure 7) and there was a strong reallocation contribution in Southeast Asia, 
the outlier. Th   e direct contribution of nearly six per cent per year in China is striking. Industry made a vis-
ible contribution in the two poorer Western Hemisphere regions but detracted from overall performance in 
Russia and Ukraine and the Middle East, with the latter gaining from reallocation. 
Figure 5:
Overall Labour Productivity Growth: 1991-2003/4

















Sources: International Labour 
Oﬃ   ce, GET database, for 
employment and World Bank, 
World Development Indicators 
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Services in Figure 8 also added to the total in the rapid growers: as with industry, a negative direct 
but positive reallocation contribution in Southeast Asia. In other regions, the direct contribution from 
services was typically negative with modest positive contributions from reallocation. Th   is distinction among 
regions has implications for job creation, as taken up below.
Finally, from an alternative data set we were able to do decompositions for the period 1980-2000 for 
the four Asian regions, with 1986 as the starting year for South Asia. Th   e results are in Figure 9. Th  e  same 
general pattern holds as in Figures 6-8, with services playing a more important role in the Tigers.
Th   e bottom line on productivity growth is that the two non-agricultural sectors made solid con-
tributions to the total in the fast-growing regions, even as their overall importance in the economy rose. 
Figure 6:
Contribution of agriculture sector 
to productivity growth: 1991-2003/4
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Elsewhere the results were a mixed bag, with no clear patterns emerging. Insofar as it is measured by average 
labour productivity growth, technological advance was evident in the growing regions and absent or, at best, 
sporadically present in other corners of the world.
Employment Growth Patterns
Figure 10 summarizes our results regarding shifts in sectoral employment to population ratios in terms of their 
contributions to changes in the ratio economy-wide. Regional growth rates of the overall ratio hovered around 
zero, with more positive than negative values. As noted above, at both the sectoral and national levels, the ratio(s) 
Figure 8:
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Figure 9:
Productivity decomposition for selected Asian regions: 1980(6)-2000
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will grow when the growth rate of output per capita exceeds labour productivity growth. Th   e ratio(s) will also 
tend to rise when population growth is negative, as was the case in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
Th   e most striking outcome in Figure 10 is the apparent similarity of all 12 regions in the sense that ser-
vices showed a rising employment to output ratio everywhere, rather strongly except in Other Africa, the Middle 
East, and (to an extent) South Asia. Th   e details, however, diﬀ  ered between fast- and slow-growing regions.
For the rapid growers, the positive contribution of services to employment growth shows that 
output per capita grew faster than the sector’s rising productivity levels that underlie its positive contribu-
tions to growth overall (darker bars in Figure 8). Positive reallocation gains were due to the fact that services 
have relatively high average productivity. In the slower growing regions, direct contributions of services to 
economy-wide productivity were weak but rising demand still created jobs. Productivity did not increase 
rapidly within the sector but via reallocation eﬀ  ects the shifts in employment toward it (reﬂ  ected in Figure 
10) added to overall productivity growth. 
Relative to total population, agriculture was a source of employable labour in nine regions, very 
strongly in Southeast Asia, and a sink only in the Middle East, Other Africa, and (especially) in the Andean 
region. Only in the Middle East and Southeast Asia was the industrial sector a strong provider of jobs (a 
fact explaining Southeast Asian industry’s strong reallocation contribution to overall productivity growth in 
Figure 7). Consistent with Figures 1 and 7, industry’s rate of productivity growth tended to exceed its growth 
in demand per capita. An old structuralist observation in development economics is that the industrial sector 
is the main motor for productivity increases but not for job creation.
Capital Productivity and Total Factor Productivity Growth (TFPG)
Th   e next topic is the role of capital accumulation in growth. We computed capital stock growth rates for 
the regions by cumulating real gross ﬁ  xed capital formation over time from a postulated initial level of the 
capital stock (capital-output ratio of 2.5) with a depreciation rate of 0.05. As discussed more fully in Appen-
Figure 10:
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dix II, after a decade or two such estimates of the capital growth rate should be insensitive to the parameters 
because capital stock growth tends to converge to investment growth over time.7
Figure 11 compares growth rates of output and the capital stock. In contrast to most other indica-
tors discussed herein, there is a clear positive association between the two growth rates across all regions—a 
standard empirical result. Th   is relationship is usually thought to emerge from the supply side as discussed 
immediately below, but it also could be attributed to demand. In a simple model based on eﬀ  ective demand, 
if investment grows at a certain rate then output and (as just indicated) the capital stock will ultimately grow 
at that rate as well. Th   e fact that the slope of the putative relationship between the two growth rates in Figure 
11 is close to one argues more for a demand- than supply-side story. In the latter, the slope would exceed 45 
degrees, with a less than one-for-one partial impact of faster capital growth on output growth.8
Also note that the capital growth rate exceeded output growth in the Tigers, China, Southeast Asia 
and the former USSR. Th   ese regions had falling capital productivity. Such an outcome can be expected in 
the rapidly growing Asian regions where industrial restructuring took place towards capital-intensive indus-
tries. Nevertheless these ﬁ  ndings can also be said to be the outcome of accounting requirements. As demon-
strated in Appendix II, the diﬀ  erence between labour and capital productivity growth rates must be equal to 
the diﬀ  erence between capital and labour growth rates as a “theorem of accounting”. If capital grows faster 
than labour, then labour productivity has to grow faster than capital productivity.9 If the capital to labour 
ratio rises very rapidly, then capital productivity growth may even have to be negative. Th   is outcome is some-
7  A caveat: our capital stock series for the former-USSR and Eastern Europe begin in 1990, which means that the 
estimated growth rates are less reliable than those for other regions where the base year was 1970.
8 Th   at is, the 45-degree slope would not ﬁ  t a neoclassical aggregate production function. It could be “explained” by a 
constant capital-output ratio, but that in turn is inconsistent with the “Asian” pattern of falling capital productivity 
discussed immediately below.
9 Th   is sort of “decreasing returns” to more capital is built into many mainstream and heterodox growth models, which 
mostly serve to rationalize the accounting identity described in the text.
Figure 11:
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times said to characterize an “Asian” pattern of growth, or a “Marx bias” in technical progress. It can also 
result from negative labour force growth as in the former USSR and Eastern Europe. 
Capital and labour productivity growth rates are plotted in Figure 12. Again note the contrast be-
tween regions. Th   e rapid growers all had negative or nearly zero capital productivity growth rates and rising 
labour productivity which could have resulted from better technology “embodied” in new capital goods. 
Detailed data show that China’s capital productivity fell more rapidly over time. Th   e former USSR lost on 
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Figure 12:
Capital and labour productivity growth rates and TFPG
Capacity productivity growth
Labour productivity growth
TFPG (0.4)12  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Instead of asking whether capital stock growth impacts directly on labour productivity (a question 
we could not directly address with our data set), much of the productivity literature focuses on “total fac-
tor productivity growth” (TFPG) or the “residual.” TFPG turns out to be a weighted average of labour and 
capital productivity growth rates, with the weights being the labour and non-labour income shares of value-
added at factor cost. Th   e question then becomes: what is the labour share? In developing countries, the share 
of remunerated labour income in GDP is likely to be less than 40 per cent. Most economically active people 
are not paid wages but rather toil within unincorporated proprietorships such as urban petty commerce, as 
labourers on peasant farms etc. Th   e market value of their work must be imputed in one way or another, with 
all the calculations being extremely dubious.
Figure 12 shows estimates of TFPG for labour shares of 0.4 (realistic?) and 0.7 (the standard num-
ber) respectively. Either way, because of their negative capital productivity growth, TFPG in the rapidly 
growing regions fell well short of labour productivity growth. For the lower labour share, TFPG in the 
Tigers and Southeast Asia was close to zero. Such ﬁ  ndings are often used to portray the failings of the “Asian 
model,” but mostly they reﬂ  ect an accounting identity and the arbitrary nature of the TFPG indicator. 
Diversiﬁ  cation of Trade
Regional diversity persists when we take up changes in patterns of foreign trade which accompany struc-
tural changes of the economy. We examine the technological composition of exports and changes in sectoral 
composition of exports and imports. For the sake of space we present visually only the changes in sectoral 
composition of exports in Figure 13.10 
Fast-growing regions generally had increases in the shares of manufactured exports. Th   e same trend 
is observed in the composition of imports with manufactures taking a greater role in regions such as South-
east Asia in which assembly operations are important. Th   e rapid growers typically also had rising technologi-
cal content of exports, the most impressive being the Tigers where high-tech exports represented 48 per cent 
of total exports in 2002 compared to 16 per cent two decades before. Technological upgrading was less evi-
10 Th   e initial and ﬁ  nal years for export compositions are 1980 and the early 2000s. 
Figure 13:
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dent in slow-growing regions. In fact several slow growers such as the Andeans maintained or even enhanced 
traditional patterns of specialization in mining products and/or agriculture. 
Human Capital (Education)
Mixed results also come out with regard to accumulation of human capital, which we measure by average 
years of schooling. Th   e output growth rates summarized in Figure 1 have no clear connection at the regional 
and country level with more education because all regions raised their levels, some quite substantially. In 
2000, the highest attained levels of education by far were in the Tigers, Eastern Europe, and the core of the 
former USSR with 9-10 average years of schooling and skilled workers making up about 2/3 of the labour 
force. Th   e lowest were in Africa with slightly more than three average years of schooling. Other Africa’s num-
bers were somewhat better than in the representative region.
How about relationships between growth in education and output? Figure 14 presents a scatter plot 
of GDP growth per capita vs. growth in average years of schooling. Th   e regression line shows a putative 
positive relationship between output expansion and educational growth, but it really only holds for the fast-
growing regions, and not that strongly for Central and Eastern Europe and South Asia. As in Figures 2-4, 
and in contrast to the picture for physical capital accumulation in Figure 11, the slow-growing regions in-
habit an amorphous data cloud. Th   ey did no worse at accumulating human capital than the others but they 
saw scant returns in growth. Education is a public good that should be supported for many reasons, but over 
the medium run its contribution to more rapid real income growth appears to be weak. More human capital 
may be a necessary or an enabling condition for sustained output growth, but it is clearly not suﬃ   cient.
Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is often touted as a potential source of technologically upgraded physical 
capital and managerial know-how more generally. But it is not obvious what level of FDI is “signiﬁ  cant”. As 
a share of GDP, for example, how large does it have to be or how rapidly should it grow to generate impor-
tant repercussions on output growth? 
Figure 14:
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FDI also tends to ﬂ  uctuate over time. As a share of GDP between 1970 and 2001, it went from 1.6 
per cent to 3 per cent (1997) to 3.1 per cent (2004) in the Tigers. Somewhat similar patterns appeared in 
Southeast Asia and China. FDI/GDP in South Asia peaked at 0.9 per cent in 1997, fell back, and then up 
to 0.8 per cent in 2004. Aside from South Asia, the rapidly growing economies received some inﬂ  ows, with 
China absorbing a very substantial share of the worldwide total. Eastern Europe resembled Eastern Asia in 
seeing the FDI share of GDP rise from 0.4 per cent in 1990 to 4.8 per cent in 2000 and 4 per cent in 2004.
Russia received relatively little FDI: it peaked at 1.7 per cent of GDP in 1999. Central America and the 
Caribbean had strong ﬂ  uctuations—nearly 4 per cent in the 1970s down to 0.4 per cent in 1982, back to 
above 4 per cent in the 1990s with the assembly/tourism boom, and then some decline. Latin America saw 
two per cent toward the end of the period. Some members of the slow-growing group of economies did little 
worse than the fast-growers in garnering FDI, without a lot of apparent pay-oﬀ  . Th   e Andes were up to 5.5 
per cent in 1993 and 3 per cent in 2004, with no positive impart on growth. Africa and the Middle East got 
negligible quantities of FDI. 
Figure 15 shows a scatter of per capita growth rates vs. shares of FDI in GDP. A positively sloped 
relationship shows up for Asia, as usual. Th   e remaining regions demonstrate their usual blob of data points. 
A relatively large FDI inﬂ  ow may possibly have a slightly stronger association than rising education with 
growth, but the relationship is still very weak.
Open economies and their patterns of net borrowing
Next, we take up interactions between demand and supply. Th   e focus is on the balance of payments, often 
the fulcrum for both short- and long-term limitations on growth in developing economies. Th   ere are at least 
three incompatible contemporary doctrines regarding how open macro-economies operate. Twin deﬁ  cits 
(TD) and Ricardian equivalence (RE) dogmata are widely spread in mainstream literature, while develop-
ment and heterodox economists often favour a structural gap (SG) explanation of external balance. 
Figure 15:
Economic growth and foreign direct investment
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In development macroeconomics, the twin deﬁ  cits hypothesis traces back at least to the IMF econo-
mist Jacques Polak’s (1957) blueprint for the “ﬁ  nancial programming” exercises that to this day are the linch-
pin of the Fund’s stabilization packages worldwide. Th   e recipe for action is to cut the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit, which is 
supposed to improve the economy’s external position. Polak, of course, was drawing on a long tradition of 
monetarist analysis of the balance of payments. In one variant, unless the private sector chooses to increase 
its saving—or, more precisely, reduce its net borrowing as discussed below— then a higher ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit must 
be paid for by domestic money creation. Aggregate demand consequently goes up. Under tacit assumptions 
that all resources are fully employed and the domestic price level is tied to foreign prices by arbitrage in for-
eign trade (purchasing power parity or PPP applies), the higher demand has to spill over into a bigger trade 
deﬁ  cit. 
Ricardian equivalence (Barro, 1974) emerges from dynamic optimal savings models postulating 
that all resources are fully employed and that households smooth their consumption (or, more generally, 
expenditure) over time. It plays a far more central role in contemporary mainstream macroeconomics than 
Polak’s somewhat dated monetarism11. Along the lines of Say’s Law, RE broadly asserts that a change in ﬁ  scal 
net borrowing will be oﬀ  set by an equal shift in private net lending. In an open economy context, any one 
country’s external position then has to be determined by inter-temporal trade-oﬀ  s between consumption and 
saving with all countries in the world producing the same good (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ  , 1997). In this context, 
traditional counter-cyclical ﬁ  scal policy does not play a role.
However, TD and RE stories are not compatible because they assign diﬀ  erent roles to private and 
foreign net borrowing. Under TD, private borrowing is “neutral” in that it does not respond to shifts in the 
foreign or ﬁ  scal positions. Under RE, the current account is neutral with regard to ﬁ  scal shifts while private 
and government borrowing dance the trade-oﬀ  s.
Finally, causality can also be interpreted as running the other way—from the foreign to the ﬁ  scal 
and/or private sector ﬁ  nancial gap. Perhaps the external deﬁ  cit is “structural” and will persist in the face of 
plausible domestic policy changes. In this sense, structure is built into foreign trade. Within “reasonable” 
ranges of real exchange rate values and the level of economic activity, the trade deﬁ  cit—or surplus, say for 
China or Germany—will not change by very much. It need not be close to zero because of lacking or excess 
competitiveness of domestic producing sectors. 
SG analysis resembles full employment RE in that its binding external gap imposes a supply con-
straint on the system. Particularly in a developing country context, the question becomes how does eﬀ  ective 
demand adjust to meet the commodity supply permitted by available imports? To hold demand stable, any 
shift in the private or public sector net borrowing position has to be reﬂ  ected into an oﬀ  setting change in the 
other domestic gap, as under RE. Mechanisms that can make this happen are sketched below. If private net 
borrowing is neutral, then ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit will reﬂ  ect a shift in the external gap: TD with causality reversed. It 
becomes interesting to see what patterns emerge from the data. 
Several borrowing styles can be identiﬁ  ed. In the Asian regions in Figure 16, the ﬁ  scal role was 
rather passive, with major adjustments taking place between private and foreign net borrowing. Th  e  private 
and foreign co-movements were relatively large, with swings up and down exceeding 10 per cent of GDP in 
the Tigers and Southeast Asia. Big reductions in external deﬁ  cits were forced from abroad in the 1997 crisis, 
11  Although, as we will see below, Polak sans PPP can help explain recent interactions between public and private sector 
deﬁ  cits in several developing regions. 16  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Figure 16:
Resource gaps by institutional sectors in the Tigers, China and South East Asia
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but upswings tended to be associated with falling private saving and rising import propensities. Maintaining 
very high per capita income growth over a 25-year period with the macro economy subject to such extreme 
ﬂ  uctuations is a feat perhaps unprecedented historically. 
Figure 17 shows the history for two regions with persistently high levels of government net borrow-
ing—rapidly growing South Asia and economically stagnant middle income Latin America. South Asia’s pri-
vate net lending share resembles China’s, except that the private surplus ﬁ  nanced a ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit while China’s 





















































































Resource gaps by institutional sectors in 
South Asia and semi-industrialized Latin America
Govt. deﬁ  cit
(% of GDP)




Source: United Nations Common 
Database.18  DESA Working Paper No. 34
external account was in surplus. Th   e large ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit (largely driven by India) did not create an equally 
large external gap because along SG lines hard currency was not available (until very recently) to pay for 
expanded imports. Th   e private sector was the only possible source of ﬁ  nance for the government’s net bor-
rowing. Except for the latter part of the recessionary “lost decade” of the 1980s, Latin America appeared to 
have a more or less structural external deﬁ  cit. Note the wide oﬀ  setting swings in the government and private 
borrowing ﬂ  ows along East Asian lines, unfortunately associated with a long period of economic stagnation 
as opposed to the other region’s rapid growth. A massive dose of ﬁ  scal austerity in the late 1980s courtesy of 
the IMF had a very modest impact on the external deﬁ  cit but was met by increased private borrowing, in a 
pattern that later partially reversed.
In Figure 18, the Andean economies, Central America and the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and rep-
resentative Africa appear to have structural external deﬁ  cits. In all cases the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit was cut back (in the 













































































































































Resource gaps by institutional sectors in Central and Eastern Europe, 
Central America and the Caribbean, Andean region and Representative Africa
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1980s in Latin America and Africa and the 1990s in Eastern Europe) as IMF-sponsored stabilization pro-
grams were wheeled into place. Rather than reductions in external deﬁ  cits, there were increases in the private 
net borrowing, with subsequent oscillations between private and government positions. 
Finally in Figure 19, in the Middle East from around 1980 until the mid-1990s, a trend reduction 
in the ﬁ  scal deﬁ  cit was accompanied by a falling foreign deﬁ  cit. A similar pattern showed up in the former-
USSR after the mid-1990s. In both regions, the “structural” factor was almost certainly the external position, 
with the ﬁ  scal accounts accommodating. In other words improvements in the ﬁ  scal position as in Russia/
Ukraine and the Middle East were probably driven by a better balance of payments, rather than the oppo-
site. Th   e ex-Soviet private sector was a net lender, while private net borrowing rose in the Middle East. Th  e 
pattern in the African region, dominated by Nigeria is less clear with apparent co-movements of private and 
foreign borrowing.
Crowding-out of private demand by higher public demand under a binding external constraint that 
holds output roughly constant is a familiar story. Harking back to Polak’s monetarist stance, if prices are not 
stabilized by PPP then they may begin to rise in response to higher eﬀ  ective demand. Inﬂ  ation tax and forced 
saving mechanisms can kick in, reducing real demand by the private sector (Taylor, 2004). In Figures 17 and 
18, such processes also appeared to work in reverse. Austerity relaxed the squeeze on the private sector, and 
its demand went up by enough to keep output close to the limit imposed by a structural external gap.
With regard to RE, there is scant evidence suggesting the presence of consumption-smoothing in 
the sense of rising private sector net lending in response to higher output. In four of the ﬁ  ve rapidly growing 
regions, private net borrowing went up as a share of GDP and net lending fell during periods of sustained, 
rapid growth. Th   e exception is China after the mid-1980s, but there it is at least plausible to argue that the 
rising external surplus drove the observed rise in private net lending than the reverse.
The Policy Background
As noted at the outset, a major policy shift occurred worldwide beginning in the 1970s and 1980s—a move 
on the part of most countries to deregulate or liberalize their external current and capital accounts along 
with domestic labour and ﬁ  nancial markets. Our empirical results help trace out its implications. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, growth performances deteriorated after 1980 in many parts of the world. 
Clear success cases at the country level—various Tigers, China, Vietnam in Southeast Asia, and more recent-
ly India—are scarcely paragons of neo-liberalism. Some Eastern European policy-makers think of themselves 
in that way but many vestiges of the old order remain.
Moreover, the fact that structural change in several dimensions—output and labour share shifts, 
trade diversiﬁ  cation, sustained productivity growth with strong reallocation eﬀ  ects in some cases—showed 
up strongly in the fast-growing economies, and sporadically elsewhere, carry an implicit message that intel-
ligent sector-level policies can facilitate the development process. To an extent, structural change can be 
planned.
In macro terms, austerity was supposed to lead to improvement in external balances along IMF 
ﬁ  nancial programming lines. Th   e decompositions described just above show clearly that was not the com-
mon outcome. Even falling government deﬁ  cits and rising external surpluses in the Middle East and Russia 20  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Figure 19:
Resource gaps by institutional sectors in the Middle East, Other Africa and former USSR
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are better explained from the external than domestic side. More typical were co-movements of private and 
government or, less frequently, private and foreign borrowing ﬂ  ows. Th   ese patterns have to be examined in 
terms of the speciﬁ  c macro behaviour of each economy concerned.
Macroeconomic ﬂ  exibility, although diﬃ   cult to deﬁ  ne and probably even harder to attain, also ap-
pears to be important. Witness the wide swings in net borrowing ﬂ  ows between 1980 and 2000 in the Tigers 
and Southeast Asia. Th   rough it all, they continued to grow. 
Stated goals of the liberalization package were to enhance labour productivity and employment 
growth. Outside the consistently expanding economies, this did not happen. Productivity movements across 
sectors diﬀ  ered in detail across slow-growing and stagnant regions but did not add up to very much. Em-
ployment to population ratios rose in the Andean and Middle Eastern regions.12 Elsewhere, liberalization did 
not help create jobs—industrial jobs in particular.
Privatization and ﬁ  nancial deregulation were followed by ﬁ  nancial crises in many countries, some-
times more than once. Th   ey were associated with vulnerability and under-regulation of the ﬁ  nancial sector 
which promoted speculative behaviour on both sides of the market. National balance sheets became danger-
ously short on foreign assets and long on domestic holdings including real estate and equity—usually newly 
created through privatization—and cycles of real exchange rate appreciation. Th   e crises help explain the 
erratic performances in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Russia. As noted above, Southeast Asia did not 
recover as strongly as the Tigers from the 1997 crisis. China and India to a large extent evaded its impacts by 
maintaining capital controls. 
Finally, the supply-side emphasis of the new policy package—austerity supposedly leading to higher 
saving and investment rates, an emphasis on human capital accumulation, and opening economies to foreign 
direct investment—did not seem to bear fruit outside the rapidly growing regions. Th   ere was a clear associa-
tion between capital stock growth and output growth across all regions, but here the supply-side interpreta-
tion is not compelling. Th   e results in Figure 10 can just as well be explained by rapid capital stock growth 
contributing to labour productivity growth and driving output growth from the side of demand with savings 
adjusting endogenously, rather than by higher savings leading to more capital which fed into output via 
some sort of aggregate production function. 
Results across the regions diﬀ  ered. Fast-growing regions were less zealous about applying the liberal-
ization philosophy, and performed better. Elsewhere, there was enough variety to suggest that speciﬁ  c aspects 
of each region and its economies were important in shaping outcomes. Structure matters. Th   e policy analysis 
challenge is to ﬁ  gure out just how and why. 
How Should Policy Change?
An idea tracing back to Adam Smith and recently restated by Reinert (2006) and formalized by Rada (2006) 
is that the economy can usefully be viewed as a combination of dynamic increasing returns sectors and 
more plodding constant or decreasing returns activities. Th   e goal is to stimulate the former while shifting 
resources, especially labour, from the latter. Figures 2 through 9 illustrate how the rapidly growing regions 
succeeded at this task. Th   e question is how to design policies that will facilitate similar processes elsewhere.
12  A rise of the ratio in Russia/Ukraine can be discounted because of negative population growth.22  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Indeed, charting institutional changes that could open up degrees of freedom for the pursuit of 
developmentalist policies may be a fruitful approach. Some examples:
Does the open economy “trilemma” really bind? Th   at is, can independent monetary/ﬁ  scal poli-
cies, exchange rate programming, and open capital markets all be combined? In the land of textbooks it is 
straightforward to show that they can be, or in other words that the Mundell-Fleming “duality” between a 
ﬂ  oating exchange rate and control of the money supply does not exist. In principle, a central bank principle 
has enough tools at its disposal to control monetary aggregates and interest rates regardless of the forces 
determining the exchange rate.13 
In practice, however, arbitrary changes in monetary and exchange rate policies may be attacked 
by markets. As emphasized by Nayyar (2005), the question then becomes one of how other policies may 
be deployed to widen the boundaries on feasible manoeuvres. Frenkel and Taylor (2006) argue that under 
appropriate circumstances a weak exchange rate can be desirable for developmentalist reasons. Th  e  “circum-
stances” include a productive sector which is responsive to price signals; a monetary authority willing and 
able to maintain a weak rate for an extended period of time, perhaps supported by capital market and other 
interventions); and, political willingness to bear the, conceivably high, initial costs of devaluation including 
potential inﬂ  ation and output contraction. Getting away from the recent obsession with using the exchange 
rate for “inﬂ  ation targeting” could be a useful step toward making it a more useful development policy tool.
In the area of industrial and commercial policy, the impact of the WTO has been to rule out inter-
ventions involving tariﬀ  s and trade while up to a point diﬀ  erent forms of subsidies (witness Airbus vs. Boe-
ing!) are still considered kosher. How can developing and transition economies operate eﬀ  ectively in this new 
environment? Th   e Smithian prescription to stimulate increasing returns sectors did not cease to apply when 
the WTO was born. Th   e question is how to implement it under present circumstances.
At the macro level, a question implicit in Figure 9 is also relevant: how can economies avoid the 
“jobless growth” that has been characteristic of the liberalization period? Evidently, productivity growth must 
be positive for per capita incomes to rise but demand growth must be stronger to create employment. It 
remains to be seen in many countries whether they will be able to program rapid growth in demand under a 
regime of liberalized international capital markets.
13  For the gory textbook details see Chapter 10 in Taylor (2004). Frenkel and Taylor (2006) present a more institutionally 
nuanced discussion. Developing and Transition Economies in the Late 20th Century:  23
References
Barro, Robert J. (1974). “Are Government Bonds Net Worth?” Journal of Political Economy, 82: 1095-1117.
Frenkel, Roberto, and Lance Taylor (2005). “Real Exchange Rate, Monetary Policy, and Employment.” Paper prepared for the 
High-Level United Nations Development Conference on the Millennium Development Goals, New York.
Godley, Wynne, and T. Francis Cripps (1983). Macroeconomics. Fontana, London.
Kuznets, Simon (1966). Modern Economic Growth. Yale University Press, New Haven.
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. (2000). “Some Macroeconomics for the 21st Century.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14: 159-168.
Maddison, Angus (2001). Th   e World Economy: A Millennial Perspective. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Paris.
Nayyar, Deepak (2005). “Development Th   rough Globalization?” Paper presented at the conference “WIDER Th  inking  Ahead: 
Th   e Future of Development Economics”, Helsinki. 
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoﬀ   (1997). “Th   e Intertemporal Approach to the Current Account.” In Gene M. Grossman and 
Kenneth Rogoﬀ   (eds). Handbook of International Economics (Vol. 3). North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Ocampo, J. A. (2005). Th   e quest for dynamic eﬃ   ciency: Structural dynamics and economic growth in developing countries. In José 
Antonio Ocampo (ed.) Beyond Reforms, Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability. Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, CA.
Pasinetti, Luigi L. (1981). Structural Change and Economic Growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Polak, J. J. (1957). “Monetary Analysis of Income Formation and Payments Problems.” International Monetary Fund Staﬀ   Papers, 
6: 1-50.
Rada, Codrina, and Lance Taylor (2006). “Empty Sources of Growth Accounting, and Empirical Replacements à la Kaldor and 
Goodwin with Some Beef,” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, (forthcoming)
Rada, Codrina, and Lance Taylor (2006). “A Growth Model for a Two-Sector Economy with Endogenous Employment.” 
Department of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York.
Reinert, Erik S. (2005). “Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development to Prevent ‘Welfare Colonialism’ “ New 
York: Paper prepared for the High-Level United Nations Development Conference on the Millennium Development Goals
Syrquin, Moshe (1986). “Productivity Growth and Factor Reallocation.” In Hollis B. Chenery, Sherman Robinson, and Moshe 
Syrquin (eds). Industrialization and Growth. Oxford University Press, New York.
Taylor, Lance (ed.) (2001). External Liberalization, Economic Performance, and Social Policy. Oxford University Press, New York.
Taylor, Lance (2004). Reconstructing Macroeconomics: Structuralist Proposals and Critiques of the Mainstream. Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA.
Taylor, Lance, and Codrina Rada (2005). “Can the Poor Countries Catch Up? Extended Sources of Growth Projections Give Weak 
Convergence for the Early 21st Century.” Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis, New School for Social Research, 
New York.
Taylor, Lance (ed.) (2006). External Liberalization in Asia, Post-Socialist Europe, and Brazil. Oxford University Press, New York.
Vos, Rob, Lance Taylor, and Ricardo Paes de Barros (eds) (2002). Balance of Payments Liberalization in Latin America: Eﬀ  ects on 
Growth, Distribution, and Poverty. Edward Elgar, Northhampton MA.24  DESA Working Paper No. 34
Appendix
Appendix I: Countries in the Regional Groups
1.  Representative Africa: Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania
2.  Other Africa: Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zimbabwe
3.  Central America and the Caribbean: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
 Jamaica
4.  Andean Region: Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru
5.  Semi-Industrialized Latin America (with Turkey and South Africa as additions): Argentina, Brazil, 
  Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela, Turkey, South Africa
6.  South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
7. China
8.  Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Philippines, Th  ailand,  Viet  Nam
9.  Tigers: Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan
10.  Middle East: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen
11.  Former-USSR: Russian Federation, Ukraine
12.  Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, SlovakiaDeveloping and Transition Economies in the Late 20th Century:  25
Appendix II: Decomposition Techniques
It is often illuminating to trace through how macro aggregates shift over time by temporally “decomposing” 
accounting identities that link them together. In appendix we present procedures for investigating changes in 
labour productivity across producing sectors, employment generation by sectors, interactions between labour 
and capital productivity growth at the economy-wide level, and net borrowing by major institutional sectors.a
Available data on output and employment come at yearly intervals. Growth rates have to be comput-
ed in discrete time, with formulas that can become quite complicated. To simplify an algebraic presentation 
as much as possible, we consider only observations at times 0 and 1. Th   e growth rate of (say) the variable X 
is “X-hat” or  0 0 1 / ) ( ˆ X X X X − =  with the subscripts standing for points in time. At time 0, the relevant 
identity for decomposing labour productivity growth is   with the 
i X 0 as output levels by sec-
tor ( n i ,...., 2 , , 1 = ). Let   be the share of sector i in real output in period zero. Similarly for 
employment:   with  . Th   e level of labour productivity in sector i is 
i i L X 0 0 /  with an 
exact growth rate between times 0 and 1 of  . In the literature, terms such 
as 
1 ) ˆ 1 (
− + L  are often said to represent “interactions.”
After a bit of manipulation, an exact expression for the rate of growth of economy-wide labour pro-
ductivity emerges as
.      (1)
Aside from the interaction term 
1 ) ˆ 1 (
− + L ,   decomposes into two parts. One is a weighted average 
 of sectoral rates of productivity growth as conventionally measured. Th   e weights are the 
output shares  . Th   e other term,  , captures “reallocation eﬀ  ects.” If   sector i  has a 
bigger share in output than employment, implying that it has relatively high average productivity. Positive 
employment growth in that sector (or a negative 
i L ˆ  in a sector with  ) will increase productivity 
overall, in line with established theories about dualism in development economics.
a  More detail on the analysis to follow is in Rada and Taylor (2006) and Taylor and Rada (2005).26  DESA Working Paper No. 34
For the record, another expression for  L x  emerges after rearrangement of (1),
.     (2)
In (2), sectoral productivity growth rates are weighted by employment shares, and the reallocation 
eﬀ  ect is stated in terms of output growth rates. Th   e message is basically the same as in (1).
Turning to employment generation, a fundamental insight is that if a sector creates jobs over time, 
then (if interaction terms are ignored) its growth rate of output per capita must exceed its growth rate of 
labour productivity. To see the details we can start with the identity   
in which  0 P  is the population at time zero. Th  at  is,   is the share of the population employed at time 0. 
Labour-output ratios (inverse average productivity levels) by sector are 
i i i
o X L b 0 0 / =  and sectoral output 
levels per capita are  . 
After grinding, the growth rate of   can be expressed as
with the   being the sectoral employment shares introduced above and   as a (presumably small) interac-
tion term. Each sector’s growth rate of labour productivity is   so that it is related to 
the growth rate of the labour/output ratio as  . A ﬁ  nal expression for   becomes 
,      (3)
with the terms multiplying   capturing the interactions. 
Th   e lead term (typically accurate to two or three signiﬁ  cant digits) is
.
Th   e growth rate of the employment/population ratio is a weighted average of diﬀ  erences between 
sectoral growth rates of output per capita and productivity. Sectors with higher shares of total employment 
 contribute more strongly to the average. One might expect that   in a “dynamic” sector, with the 
inequality reversed in one that is “declining” or just “mature.”Developing and Transition Economies in the Late 20th Century:  27
Next we consider labour and capital productivity in tandem on an economy-wide basis. Ex-
act expressions for the growth rates of the two variables are   and 
. Th   e growth of capital stock is given by the standard equation 
 in which  0 I  is gross ﬁ  xed capital formation and   is a “radioactive” depreciation rate (ap-
proximately equal to the inverse of the average lifetime of a capital good).
We estimated the capital stock growth rates used in the text by running the accumulation equation 
forward through time from an initial guess at the level of capital (from a capital to output ratio of 2.5) and 
a depreciation rate of 0.05. After a decade or so, the computed growth rates were insensitive to these param-
eters. Th   is outcome is more or less built into the algebra. If investment grows at a rate g, for example, then 
the capital stock growth rate will converge to that value, independent of initial conditions and the value of  .
Usually, labour and capital productivity growth rates are lumped together into a number called 
“total factor productivity growth” (TFPG) or, more realistically, the “residual”  . It is deﬁ  ned from the 
equation
       (4)
in which   is the share of labour in total factor payments. Evidently,   is a weighted average of capital and 
labour productivity growth rates,
.           ( 5 )
Equation (4) can be derived by taking the ﬁ  rst diﬀ  erence of the factor payments identity built into 
the national accounts,   (in which   and  0 r  are real wage and proﬁ  t rates respectively), 
or else from the usual mainstream mumbo-jumbo about an aggregate production function and associated 
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          ( 6 )
will hold to a good approximation. In words, if growth rates of labour and capital are pre-determined then 
the growth rate of labour productivity implies the growth rate of capital productivity or vice-versa. If capital 
grows much more rapidly than labour and there is positive labour productivity growth, then the growth rate 
of capital productivity may well be negative. Empirical implications of this observation are discussed in the 
text.
A ﬁ  nal topic is how diﬀ  erent institutional sectors contribute to eﬀ  ective demand. Growth analysis 
based only on supply-side factors does not capture the impacts on demand patterns of changes in institutions 
and policy such as liberalization. We focus on the three main institutional sectors: government, the private 
sector, and the rest of the world. 
One approach involves a decomposition of shifts in aggregate demand due to changes in “injections” 
(investment I, exports E and government spending G) and parameters for “leakages” (saving rate s, import 
rate m, and tax rate t). One can identify the sector or sectors that lead output growth through high demand 
as signalled by large ratios of their injection levels to leakage rates. Th   e exercise in its essence identiﬁ  es each 
sector’s own-multiplier eﬀ  ect on output growth. 
A variant representation which we use here emphasizes levels of net borrowing by sector, deﬁ  ned 
as the diﬀ  erence between investment and saving (I – sX) in the case of private sector, government spending 
less tax revenues (G – tX), and exports minus imports for the rest of the world (E – mX).b Private positive 
net borrowing means that the sector is running up net liabilities by investing more than it saves while at the 
same time it is contributing to higher demand-side output growth. Similar statements apply to the other two 
sectors.
Th   e aggregate accounting balance
        ( 4 )
must necessarily hold, so net lending by the government or foreign sector (or both) would be required to 
compensate for a private sector deﬁ  cit. 
b Th   e supply or output concept (X) here is implicitly equal to GDP at factor cost plus imports of goods and services.Developing and Transition Economies in the Late 20th Century:  29
One ﬁ  nal point worth emphasizing is that all the discussion is framed in terms of macro aggregates 
measured in real market prices, not in terms of purchasing power parity. Th   e rationale is to keep the analysis 
as close as possible to normal macroeconomic discourse.
When used in international comparisons, PPP calculations basically revalue the labour content of 
output by sector. For example, the dollar cost of an up-market haircut in Mumbai at the current rupee/dol-
lar exchange rate might be $5. A similar service in New York City could run $50. A PPP re-computation 
of Indian GDP raises the labour cost for the Mumbai barber to something closer to that of her New York 
counterpart. 
Comparisons of income levels in these terms have been become the accepted methodology, as in the 
results reported in Figure 1. However, PPP computations also move macro aggregates far away from their 
“normal” market price levels. Non-traded goods are re-valued in comparison to traded goods, the residential 
capital stock rises and non-residential falls, imports change relative to exports, and so on. In the text, we 
focus on standard macroeconomics, and for that reason we eschew PPP.